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Rupert Read
THe TaLe PaRfiT TeLLs: anaLyTic  
MeTaPHysics of PeRsonaL idenTiTy vs. 
WiTTgensTeinian fiLM and LiTeRaTURe
Abstract. at the center of derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons is nestled 
a famous short story about a person who uses a teletransporter. Parfit 
argues that his “thought experiment” shows that “personal identity”—as 
(analytic) philosophy understands it—doesn’t matter. as long as i know 
that my “self” on Mars is unharmed by the teletransporter, it shouldn’t 
matter to me that i remain on earth, soon to die. i use christopher 
Priest’s novel The Prestige and the nolan brothers’ film of it to challenge 
the method and alleged moral of this “branch-line” teletransportation 
thought experiment, treating it as a work of literature in miniature. 
[B]ecause i have shown my hands to be empty you must now 
expect not only that an illusion will follow but that you will 
acquiesce in it. 
—Borden, in The Prestige
nothing is so difficult as not deceiving oneself. 
—Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value
What has to be overcome is not difficulty 
of the intellect but of the will.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions
“are you watching closely?”
—Borden’s opening line in the film The Prestige
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I
The last line of Parfit’s description of the “branch-line case” of tele-
transportation, the very epicenter of his hugely influential thought 
experiment that famously proposes a radically new view on “personal 
identity,” runs as follows: “[W]hile i stand here speechless, i can see and 
hear myself, in the studio on Mars, starting to speak.”1 Parfit, notori-
ously, goes on to argue that the “branch-line” version of me, the “i” in 
the story, shouldn’t/needn’t be sad that he is going to die, because he 
is going to survive—or at least, something is going to happen which is 
just as good as his surviving.2 
He is to all intents and purposes on Mars. This is the radical conclusion 
that Parfit argues for: that “Personal identity is not what matters” (RP, 
p. 217), and that “Relation-R” (roughly, psychological connectedness) 
is what matters, and is preserved by “me”3 being on Mars, thus render-
ing irrelevant the existence of another (shorter-lived) me still on earth.
Parfit immediately goes on to ask the following question: “What can 
we learn from this imaginary story? some believe that we can learn 
little. This would have been Wittgenstein’s view” (RP, p. 273). granted, 
there is some potential support for this claim of Parfit’s. one might, for 
instance, consider Wittgenstein’s remark from The Blue and the Brown 
Books:4 “[W]ere dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde two persons or were they the 
same person who merely changed? We can say whichever we like. We 
are not forced to talk of a double personality.” But what i suggest is that 
actually, we (including we Wittgensteinians) can learn something from 
this imaginary story, but that a philosopher like Wittgenstein would not 
have “learnt” from the story (and from other stories, movies, etc., that 
we might profitably bring into alignment or conversation with it) what 
Parfit famously claimed to have learnt and claimed we should learn. 
As a Wittgensteinian, i think there may well be (different) things that 
we can learn from it. Things ultimately more amenable to what i think 
would be Wittgensteinian thinking about what it is to be a person; what 
it is to care about whether or not one is “oneself” going to die (see RP, 
pp. 287–88). i will try to explain this.
Why will i draw on a novel/movie in order to do so? Because these 
help us richly to see different ways in which a thought experiment—a 
little piece of literature—such as Parfit’s may play out. different possi-
bilities that can free our minds from the rails on which Parfit attempts 
to place them.
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II
at the very end of Parfit’s little story, the “me” on Mars starts to 
speak—to me (as it were). My claim would be: in such communicative 
acts are people formed. Born, even. 
in the general background of my thinking on this stands the philo-
sophical sociology of dewey and of Mead, and symbolic interactionism. 
Though it undoubtedly has serious flaws and limitations (partly those 
exposed by Wittgensteinian ethnomethodology), the Meadian approach 
does adduce and facilitate a basic understanding of the vast importance 
(and the real nature) of social interaction, for the formation and con-
tinual reformation of the self. We can imagine a conversation happening 
between the two “me’s,” turn-taking reasonably and appropriately, one 
presumes, as they (we) are perhaps starting to do in the final line of 
Parfit’s sci-fi tale.5 While he speaks, that is to say, unless we talk across 
each other, i listen. My claim would be: right there is the disproof of 
Parfit’s moral of the story. as we take turns in conversation, i am first 
the listener and then the speaker. You, then me. and further: we become 
who we are (and in what we say) in such encounters.6
Parfit himself perhaps hints (on earth, i’m “speechless”) that the 
conversation would not necessarily be easy. Why not? Because i am 
going to die. This is disturbing. The “me” on Mars might well also be 
disturbed by this. But, presumably, not as much; or at least, not quite 
in the same way. (for, in roughly Heideggerian terms: one cannot die 
another’s death.)
What might this conversation (which Parfit refrains from picturing) 
actually look like? at a great distance, and in a relatively public place, 
it might well be fairly stilted. imagine if the teletransporter only trans-
ported one some yards away, rather than some millions of miles. in 
that case, the two versions of the self could meet and really talk (and 
more), almost instantly. 
Perhaps they would embrace, one of them offering solace to the 
other. The other might perhaps declare, “go live your life in full, for 
both of us.”
This possibility is roughly described, in a somewhat similar case, in the 
christopher Priest novel7—a marvelous meditation on human doubling 
remade by christopher nolan (to a script by his brother, Jonathan) 
into an even more philosophically fascinating and relevant movie, The 
Prestige.8 But so is another possibility, a possibility of a less pleasant kind. 
(see especially p. 118 of the script of The Prestige, on the first possibility.) 
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The words i have “quoted” above encapsulate exactly how the magician 
Borden deals with his impending death—in conversation with fallon, his 
secret doppelganger, his secret twin brother. (see especially pp.124–26 
and the discussion below, of angier’s duplication, on the second—less 
pleasant—possibility.) 
The Prestige is a tale of two magicians who are first colleagues, and 
then rivals. at the end of the story, it turns out that “one” of the two 
magicians, Borden, is actually two people: two twins pretending to be 
one person (almost as if living as two halves of one person—almost, but, 
as we shall see, not). This enables him to do all sorts of tricks, such as 
(most strikingly) the “transported man,” in which the magician appears 
to move instantaneously from one side of the theater to the other. near 
the end of the film, one of the Borden twins is publicly executed. The 
other lives on—presumably secretly—to take vengeance for the one who 
died and, perhaps more important, to bring up his daughter/niece. i 
return to this, below. 
The other magician, angier, to equal and better Borden, eventually 
gets hold of an actual teletransporter. This allows him to move from 
one side of the theater to the other instantaneously. But there is a catch: 
When the teletransporter fires off, it leaves him also, or, if you prefer, 
a duplicate/replica of him, inside the teletransporter. so far, so very 
Parfittian. and here is the alternative (less pleasant) possibility that The 
Prestige presents for how to handle such an eventuality: because (at least 
in part; see below) of his desire that the secret of his teletransporter not 
to be discovered (which it surely would be if more and more versions 
of him were alive in the world), angier kills his other self each time 
the teletransporter fires off. The first time, by pistol; every successive 
time, by having the version of himself that remains untransported fall 
through a trapdoor under the stage and drown. Here is a branch-line 
case with a vengeance….
What is the point? The point is that we, in part because we are through-
and-through social creatures (as Wittgenstein, among others, has 
stressed), living our lives in very significant part through our relation-
ships to others, would surely never be able to have the kind of relaxed 
attitude to the branch-line case that Parfit recommends. and we should 
note that the very term “branch-line case” that Parfit picks is prejudicial. 
Think of the underlying railway metaphor here: a branch line goes 
away from the main line and does not return to it, does not cross it 
again. easily replicated if one “me” is on Mars and the other on earth. 
But what if we are both in the same room, after the teletransporter has 
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done its job? What if the branch line and the main line instantly cross 
paths again in this way? The film version of The Prestige is interested in 
this question. 
at the mathematical limit, at the very moment of teletransportation, 
it might be possible to do as Parfit recommends: to conceive of the 
two beings as interchangeable. But as soon as we start to speak to each 
other (or embrace each other, or seek to dispose of each other, etc.), we 
are not in any meaningful sense the same person any more. in Parfit’s 
branch-line case, the earth “me” has to come to terms with dying, while 
“he,” over there on Mars, will live. He has to come to terms with my 
death, but not in the same sense that i do. i have to come to terms with 
my death; he has to come to terms with my death. 
These are already very different people. Their existential placement 
with regard to one another, as must and will immediately emerge in 
their conversation (or in whatever else happens between them), differs 
significantly. 
i think that it is excessively convenient (for the case that Parfit wishes 
to make) that one of us is on earth and the other on Mars. This is an 
initial move made by Parfit in his “conjuring trick,” which takes place 
without us even noticing it (see Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations9). 
it seems a perfectly innocuous feature of his little story (his thought 
experiment) that the teletransportation takes place between earth and 
Mars. But, it turns out, it isn’t. if the teletransporter instead transports—
or rather, duplicates—across a theater / across a room, such that the 
two people who have come from one original then confront each other, 
the whole situation is quite different. Parfit can ignore the interaction 
between, and potential competition between, the two “me’s” that he 
depicts, because they are literally worlds apart; but such interaction 
can’t be ignored if they confront each other in person at once. an appar-
ently innocuous feature of Parfit’s thought experiment turns out to be 
determinative, and misleading. strip it away, as the nolan brothers do, 
and the whole story changes.
Were we within spitting (or shooting) distance, surely we could not 
possibly take a relaxed attitude toward what was about to transpire 
between us. if we are physically present to each other, if our mutual 
physicality as well as our mutual conversation is foregrounded, as it is 
in The Prestige, then the difference in our personhood cannot be con-
cealed. This is disturbingly (and beautifully) portrayed in the movie by 
the horror on the face of the angier who is about to be murdered, by 
“himself.” a limited sense of this emerges in the relevant portion of 
the movie’s script:
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The machine sputters out.
angieR is sTiLL sTanding BeneaTH iT.
angieR (confused): it didn’t work.
voice (voiceover): yes it did.
angieR TURns...
anoTHeR angieR is standing on the chalk hashmark, sTeaM rising 
off his shoulders.
The first angier lunges for the pistol and levels it at the second angier.
second angieR (horrified): no, wait! i’m the—
Bang! Bang! The first angier fiRes TWo sHoTs and, grim faced, 
drops the pistol. sHocKed. He stumbles back, in a daze, clothes still 
steaming. (The Prestige script, p. 125)
now, if, in Parfit’s scenario—after learning about the branch line—i 
continue to use the teletransporter, then that seems not so very differ-
ent from deciding over and over again (as angier does, in the Prestige 
scenario, for the sake of his trick, for the sake of the obsessive struggle 
he is engaged in to better Borden) to murder “myself.”
Have i given away the store by continuing to speak simply of “angier” 
after the point where he kills his doubled self each time he sets off the 
teletransporter? is this enough to entitle Parfit to conclude that the 
branch lines don’t matter? i think not. each time there is a branch line, 
there are briefly two angiers. Then one gets killed by the other. Then 
there is just (one) angier again. for convenience we may refer to the 
surviving angier, each time, as “angier.” But this doesn’t make what has 
happened matter any the less, especially perhaps from the point of view 
of the one killed. it is still something that matters (a lot!). However, Parfit 
would plainly want to deny that this matters (a lot). Parfit thinks this: 
Leaving aside the pain of the killing, why am i supposed to care about 
my death in this circumstance? in the future there will be somebody 
exactly like me, doing all the things i usually do, and so on. in order 
fully and satisfactorily to answer Parfit here, i need to make use of the 
importance to us of our sociality and our individuality.
i think that the nolans’ presentation of teletransporting is far more 
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finely attuned, psychically, than Parfit’s. We see this attunement in the 
look of horror on the second angier’s face. We can also hear it in the 
poignancy of his last words: “no, wait! i’m the—.” What was he going to 
say, had he not been cut off? surely, “— real angier!” The poignancy, of 
course, is that he is not the real angier. Because, roughly: they both are. 
When Tesla, the creator (in The Prestige) of the teletransporter, has 
realized that his electric teletransporter is working, but through a 
“branch-line” method that duplicates the original, as they stand amid 
a load of identical versions of angier’s hat, Tesla tells angier not to 
forget to take his hat with him. angier asks which is his real hat. Tesla 
replies, “They are all your hat” (The Prestige script, p. 92). The movie 
version of The Prestige expertly explores the horror, the terrible turn 
in events, that may follow from duplication, not merely of hats but of 
human beings (specifically of angier, and in a way, of course, of Borden, 
too). Whereas Parfit seems to think such duplication simply a kind of 
irrelevant accident. 
Henceforth, if both angiers survived, they would be in absolute 
competition—unless they cooperated, a growing army of angiers, and 
somehow managed to keep hidden and fed and so on. This cooperative 
possibility, not considered by the story, would allow us perhaps more 
of a sense that the other is another “me”—as perhaps in aristotle’s 
notion of one’s friend as another self. However, this remote possibility, 
while potentially interesting, obviously doesn’t amount to what Parfit 
is looking for. (We shall return to this possibility in section 3 below, in 
connection with what one might think is a flaw in the story: the lack of 
consideration of such possibilities.) 
The term “second angier” that the  film script reaches for at this point 
is arbitrary. (it is simply a matter of which one appears first on camera, 
as the scene is filmed.) one is not first and the other not second. They 
are equal—though that is far from making one of them disposable! 
you can’t simply replace one with the other. Parfit’s view is tantamount 
to saying that you can. His attitude toward human doubles is rather 
like the attitude Borden manifests toward the little tweeting birds that 
he kills every night in one of his tricks, pretending that the “identical” 
bird that he then reveals as alive is numerically identical to the bird that 
he made disappear—and that he in fact killed. angier wants to take a 
similar attitude toward his doubles—but the toll of killing himself over 
and over is in fact grave. 
each angier thinks, it seems, that only one of him is real. Parfit says 
one is just as good as the other, so you only need one of them. Their 
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mistakes are complementary, alarmingly close cousins. (Parfit seems 
to have inadequate grounds for thinking that one angier was doing 
something wrong, in hastening the departure from this mortal coil of 
his so-called “branch-line” counterpart.) Both angier and Parfit miss 
what i think the film itself indicates, and that i suggest a Wittgensteinian 
would/should surely conclude: namely, that the two angiers are both 
equally real, equally authentic inheritors of the angier mantle, and 
there is no decent case for one of them being subject to the other, still 
less eliminable at will. They are two people, and we can see this in the 
fact that they converse (and more!) with each other.
if one looks closely at the crucial sequence in the film where we 
finally see angier duplicating himself for the first time, it is i think fairly 
clear that angier simply does not know what he is going to do if the 
machine works and duplicates him. He has a pistol ready, but this is in 
case the machine produces a wraith or monster or in some other way 
harms him, when and if it works. He is not expecting to use the pistol 
on “himself.” This indecision fits with the Wittgensteinian critique that 
(i suggest below) the film makes of the general tendency, present even 
in the very magicians who exploit it, not to want to see what is in front 
of one’s very eyes. it is likely, in fact, i think, that angier deliberately 
represses thinking about what is going to happen next, that he doesn’t 
want to see the future that he is creating, such that, when he suddenly 
stands facing “himself,” only then does the horror dawn on him. only 
then do both angiers think of the pistol, to which one of them is stand-
ing nearer than the other.
The Prestige explores in a sensitive way the psychical pressure of such 
repeated splitting (and killing). after the first time, the one who is to 
be killed certainly knows what is about to be done to him. in the end 
this repeated action becomes, arguably, the main topic of the film. (But 
Parfit deliberately suppresses the issue, i contend, in his little narrative.)
This point is explicitly explored, retrospectively, in (the remaining) 
angier’s last moments alive, as he contests Borden’s claim that he, 
Borden, paid a heavier price during his life than angier did, for his art:
angieR: do you want to see what it cost me? 
you didn’t see where you are, did you? Let me show you.
angier slumps to the floor as he tries to reach for the lantern. He can’t 
get his hand to obey him.
angieR (cont.): it took courage to climb into that machine every night...
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inT. UndeR THe sTage—evening—fLasHBacK
a drowning tank, identical to the one we have already seen. 
a blind stagehand sits behind it, smoking.
angieR (voiceover): not knowing if i’d be the Prestige [the successful 
flourish at the end of a magic trick— in this case, the “transported man” 
appearing]....
suddenly, a trap door flashes open as angier falls from the stage door 
and sPLasHes into the tank. The lid snaps shut.
angieR (voiceover) (cont.): or the man in the box...
angier pounds on the glass [of the drowning tank], frantic. The blind 
stagehand continues smoking. oblivious. (The Prestige script, pp.125–26)
if we can successfully imagine the kind of scenario depicted by Parfit 
and by the nolans, then we can see that the more attuned and intel-
ligible and human line to take (than Parfit’s—let alone than angier’s) 
is that the duplicate person immediately becomes a consequentially 
different person. one of them is slightly closer to the pistol than the 
other; or one of them is taking a bow while the other drowns. Their 
lives immediately, radically, diverge.
it seems then that Parfit’s famous, boldly philosophically and ethi-
cally revisionist take on his own tale risks a kind of emotional illiteracy/
unintelligence. it is all too helpful to him that his little tale ends when it 
does. Had it not ended there, he would have had to consider properly 
how the “me” on Mars feels about this situation, and i suspect that the 
answer would be: not good. 
The series of murders takes a terrible psychical toll on angier. it 
carries a huge cost that Borden doesn’t see (because he doesn’t really 
want to see it), as noted above. and we should also ask: Why exactly 
doesn’t Borden want to see this? in my view, because the life of Borden, 
as latterly that of angier, has been broken by the secret that he (they) 
has (have) to keep. Because of this secret, Borden loses both his women, 
one to suicide. The loss also comes because of the coldness with which 
Borden maintains the secret, the unfeelingness of each of his halves 
toward the wife or mistress he does not love—even after seeing how 
angier lost the same mistress to him for the same reason! 
The Prestige is in that sense a tragedy of obsession, of repeated, predict-
able failure. Borden thinks he has won, at the end. But he has lost a 
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very great deal, in “winning.” if he allowed himself to see what angier’s 
secret had cost angier, Borden would find it much harder to avoid see-
ing what his secret had cost him(-self); and that might even, say, drive 
him insane with grief, rather than leaving him feeling the winner. He 
has won through seeing through his final illusion, his ultimate trick, 
practiced against angier, of one twin dying and the other surviving to 
take revenge on angier and take back his daughter. His final goal is to 
reclaim his daughter from angier, which he does successfully, and in a 
powerful scene just before the film’s close he reveals himself to her; this 
ultimate trick, with Borden himself as “the prestige,” was performed for 
her benefit—and for angier’s, and for ours. But his self-satisfaction in 
victory rather occludes from him, i think, the emotional and relational 
disaster that was his life, prior to that point, and the cost incurred for 
everyone else other than his surviving self and his daughter. 
of this range of possibilities/likelihoods, the possible terrible con-
sequences of having a replica, terrible consequences that Borden and 
angier seek to block from themselves but that the nolans make visible, 
we get in Parfit’s little tale virtually no sense. Had the conversation 
between the two “me’s” developed at all, i think Parfit’s moral to it would 
already have been undermined. Parfit doesn’t offer us the conversation, 
which surely might continue in some fashion to the moment that the 
earth “me” dies. This is to omit the most telling part of the narrative, 
the most important part of the enquiry.
But now—having seen The Prestige—we can imagine it. so we can, i 
think, undercut Parfit’s conclusion.
III
We can also go one step further, by reflecting on something in the 
plot of the movie version of The Prestige that looks prima facie like a 
serious flaw, once one notices it: Why didn’t angier just use the Tesla 
machine once only, and create an exact duplicate of himself, and use 
it (him) in a “transported man” illusion, just as Borden used his twin?
Part of the answer is that angier is so obsessed with bettering Borden’s 
magic trick that he wants to do it for real, to transport himself, in a 
way that Borden cannot rival. every night, every time. Thus he would 
not be content merely to copy—to duplicate—Borden’s trick, by creat-
ing and using a permanent twin. He imagines the teletransporter as 
the ultimate way of being the greater magician—of really transporting 
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himself in an instant from here to there. (Thus he calls his trick “the 
real transported man.”)
But, as indicated earlier, i think that the answer in part is also that 
angier has a horror of his doppelganger, a fear of it (of him) as a rival. i 
think that we, the film’s viewers, do too. That we retain a clear folk fear 
of the double/doppelganger—see, for instance, daphne du Maurier’s 
The Scapegoat or dostoyevsky’s The Double—has surely something to do 
with the enormous implicit value we place upon our own individuality 
and the fear of it being undermined by someone who is just like us and 
yet somehow not (like) us. The double may also function as an antici-
pation of, or figure for, more or less schizophreniform delusion, as an 
autoscopic premonition of our own possible loss of control or internal 
doubledness or splitness. (We never know if dostoyevsky’s golyadkin has 
a double or is undergoing a complete mental breakdown, like Hermann 
and his apparent double in nabokov’s Despair.) 
don’t we intuitively agree, and rightly so, with Tesla, that there is 
something deeply wrong about this duplicating teletransporter machine? 
That it should not be used, that it should be destroyed? (The same is 
true, i suggest, of the Parfit “branch-line” teletransporter; there is some-
thing uncannily and profoundly wrong, both in the doubling itself and 
in the grave hastening of the end of my life, which corresponds to and 
enables the beginning of existence for my double on Mars.) 
i think this is also why many of us fail to notice this apparent plot flaw. 
We don’t particularly want to see it; we don’t want to think that there is / 
could be a potentially, relatively harmless use of the Tesla teletransporting 
device that angier has: if he created a permanent double for himself to 
copy Borden’s trick. (This “not wanting to see” is, in Wittgenstein’s view, 
the central problem of philosophy as a practice; witness the epigraphs 
to this paper, and see also PI, pp. 65–67, and Joel Backstrom’s essay, 
“Wittgenstein and the Moral dimension of Philosophical Problems”10) 
Wittgenstein’s aim is to get each of us “to do something you don’t want 
to do.”11 This is the real meaning, too, of Wittgenstein’s seminal insight 
that philosophical problems are really problems of the will, not of the 
intellect. We don’t really want to see this; nor, apparently, does angier.
for, after all, the fear of the uncanny creation of the double, the fear 
of the other as a rival, is, as already intimated, not merely irrational, 
either. for what if it were the other, not me, who wanted always to be 
“the prestige,” to be the one getting the applause? (angier had already 
experienced this deeply dissatisfying turn of affairs when his body double 
took the applause in the early version of “the transported man.”) What if 
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the other turned against you, as actually happens of course in the scenario 
that the film offers us? (see the section of script quoted above; and also 
the scene, earlier in the film, in which the duplicated cat immediately 
chases in a decidedly unplayful manner after its double, the first time 
that Tesla uses the machine to successfully transport a living creature.) 
How could one insure against such possibilities? only by virtue of deep 
faith in a pact, like the one Borden has with his twin. 
Borden’s double is his twin, his “other half”; angier’s double appears 
to him as a threat, a rival personage; this in a certain sense demonstrates 
how different one’s relationship with one’s Parfittian duplicate would 
be from one’s relation to oneself. The murderous rivalry between the 
two magicians is echoed in a macabre fashion in the murderous rivalry 
between the two angiers. Borden eventually triumphs, in a way (though 
see below), because “he”—his twins—cooperate so seamlessly that they 
become almost as if one person (almost), such that the Borden who is 
executed (because of angier’s actions) is fairly untroubled about his 
death. Though not, i think, as untroubled as Parfit would have it: He 
certainly isn’t indifferent to his death. it is still his death.
such expressions as “Borden and his twin brother” are therefore 
actually rather misleading. Borden, very roughly, has one life; the twin 
brothers share, impossibly, one life. This is the unbelievable sacrifice, so 
deep that we (the film’s audience) don’t even think of it as a possibility 
until it is revealed to us, as noted above. “We don’t want to see it”: in 
the words that Borden uses to angier early on in the film, gazing in 
awe at the chinese magician who pretends his whole life that he is a 
cripple, so that he can fool people into believing his tricks (since they 
presume he is physically incapable of carrying them off): “Total devo-
tion to his art. Utter self-sacrifice” (The Prestige script, p. 21). in Tesla’s 
words to angier, while trying to persuade him (and knowing that he will 
fail) not to use the teletransporting machine: “Mr. angier, the cost of 
such a machine—” [angier:] “Price is not an object.” [Tesla:] “Perhaps 
not, but have you considered the cost?” (The Prestige script, p. 55). one 
must admire the willpower required to pay such costs, to make such 
self-sacrifices; and one ought to feel too a certain dismay or horror at it. 
a sense of alienation from it, and from the horribly alienating effects 
that living it can have.
But, and this is crucial: the pact between the Bordens is agreed early 
in life by the twins. can one agree to a pact with(in) oneself before 
splitting? surely not. for it doesn’t mean anything to pretend to make 
a pact with a being that doesn’t exist yet. for a pact is a contract, a deal 
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with two existent parties. once the splitting into the two “lines” has 
occurred, one (which one?) has to start afresh. Parfit seems to miss this; 
he assumes that the two “me’s” are in fundamental, relevant respects 
the same. But i have argued that the very act of splitting irrevocably 
means a fresh start, for two people, two inheritors of the same person. 
one cannot assume that the two angiers would form a pact—as the two 
Bordens, brought up together, did, as a deliberate act. angier himself 
cannot assume this.
so this neglected aspect of the film’s plot is in fact, once one thinks it 
through, yet a further strike against Parfit’s philosophy. Parfit’s claim that 
the relationship of the replica to me is “as good as ordinary survival” is 
seriously problematic. i would claim that, for ordinary survival to exist, 
my replica would have to be me and there would have not to be any 
other competitors for this title (since, given the value we place upon 
individuality, a situation where there are two or more of me would not 
be as desirable as ordinary survival). This means that the branch-line 
case cannot be seen as Parfit would like us to see it, as not producing 
enduring problems for those who can master their intuitions as he 
believes we ought to master them. 
one could counter this by saying that Borden’s life shows that i 
needn’t be right in thinking this. one can have two “me’s” and this can 
be a good thing, if one’s life’s project is (for example) to be a great 
magician with a great trademark trick such as “the transported man.” 
But i would counter by saying, first, that this ignores the terrible cost, 
which Borden himself does not really allow himself to see, of his life as 
doubled (as noted above; and i develop this point in section 7). second, 
angier’s terror at his own double may itself be based on just the kind 
of worries that i am bringing out in this paper. indeed, angier’s actions 
bring out a frightening possibility that the teletransporter branch-line 
case is already pregnant with. 
IV
now consider the following possible objection to my argument thus 
far: “in saying that the two angiers are both the real angier (just like 
the teletransported hats), you seem to be violating the conventions 
of identity talk that Parfit both exploits (by using them to argue that 
two different people can’t be one and the same person) and tries to 
undermine (by getting us to see that, if identity talk makes no sense 
in these circumstances, then we might separate issues of identity from 
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issues of what Parfit sometimes calls “survival,” and give more weight 
to the latter). Do you think that two people can be one and the same 
person or not?”12
My answer is this: i make a crucial distinction between “the real angier” 
and “the same (angier).” i think that Parfit thinks that because there is 
no one real angier, then, as far as what matters goes, they are the same 
(hence his emphasis on psychological connectedness/continuity, and 
on one surviving, regardless of whether one’s “extra copy” survives or 
not). i aim thoroughly to undermine that inference. 
so: it’s not that i think, paradoxically, that both angiers are the real 
angier. it’s rather that i think that each is just as much the real angier 
as the other. and: i think that as soon as there are two of them, then 
they are not the same person. i aim to press the latter point against Parfit, 
moving on from the end of what he tells us in his little tale to what we 
can learn from the more extended story in The Prestige.
This does not commit me to any philosophical revisionism vis-à-vis 
“personal identity.” Wittgenstein repeatedly emphasizes that, when we 
reach sufficiently strange borderline or novel cases, our “intuitions”—our 
very concepts—gradually give out.13 That’s right; but it doesn’t deprive 
us of being able to connect with such cases the kinds of considerations 
that Wittgenstein (rightly) brings to bear, again repeatedly, to emphasize 
the sociality of our minds and ourselves, the centrality to our very being 
of who we are in relation to others. so the novel situation where there 
are two “me’s” turns into just a new testing ground for that centrality. 
That is what Wittgensteinians are likely to learn from Parfit’s scenario.
V
Parfit seems, we might say, to ignore or underplay the importance 
of both relationality and individuality (including “ipseity,” the sense of 
individual identity or selfhood) in our culture. as Jerry goodenough 
argues in “can value Be duplicated?”14 if being an individual has a 
value, then something vital is lost if i am replaced by a duplicate and 
something is also lost if i survive with a duplicate. Parfit wants for ethi-
cal reasons to weaken the sense of the first-person individual that we 
have. Throughout the central, epochal section of Reasons and Persons, 
Parfit talks about our being able to give “an impersonal description” 
(emphasis in original) of the world, one that could describe the nature 
of our experiences but without “claiming they are had by a subject of 
experiences” (RP, p.225). But i cannot see that we could do this without 
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omitting or overlooking much of value. Parfit thinks that there would 
be no loss if the sense of the first-person individual were weakened, but 
rather an inevitable (alleged) improvement in altruistic concern; but i 
can’t help feeling that there is a loss. 
Why? Because being an individual—and being just the individual we 
are, emerging in relation to others (even if those others might from 
a certain point of view loosely be described as… ourselves)—has an 
important and enduring value for us. (Though this is not to commit 
oneself either to the political philosophy of liberalism or to a contro-
versial individualism; it is rather simply to acknowledge a deep feature 
of our social being. We find ourselves only in community; but what we 
find in community remains ourselves: beings that are individual as well 
as “communitarian” and thoroughgoingly social.)15 
There is a huge difference between “me” on Mars and me on earth—a 
difference whose phenomenology Parfit never burrows into or explores, 
and which in fact he deliberately aims to undermine. The very conclu-
sion for which he argues is undermined by what his argument aims to 
undermine. His claim is disproved by his very revisionism. He begs the 
question, while the question is answered already by the different feelings 
of the two protagonists. in these, they are different people.
someone might want to defend Parfit at this point by citing Mark 
Johnston’s Surviving Death,16 which includes an extended dialogue with 
Parfit (and like-minded philosophers of personal identity) that is both 
sympathetic and critical. Johnston argues that we can survive death 
(if we are good) by being reborn in, living on in, the values of others. 
i broadly agree, but that doesn’t make otiose our “personness” now. 
Johnston offers us a real philosophical consolation. But neither he nor 
Parfit eliminates, neutralizes, or even lessens very much the sense of 
who i am and who i become in relation to others and in conversation 
(and more) with them, whereby Parfit’s revisionist claims based on the 
teletransporter/branch-line case are, i have argued, quite hopeless.
VI
What would Parfit himself say to these criticisms of his views? The 
question isn’t just hypothetical. i’ve asked him, and his answer informs 
various aspects of this paper (see especially note 3). given his avowed 
revisionism, he would probably be thoroughly unmoved. He might see 
these criticisms simply as a restatement of the very moral intuitions that 
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he thinks we should overcome.17 He would thus perhaps see the present 
piece as lacking in arguments, or as not offering reasons. 
Parfit would perhaps think that he has covered the worries that i 
have raised, through the points he makes about what he takes to be 
“the true theory”—i.e., his theory, which would give up the intuition 
that the self who is going to die on earth should be bothered by this, 
in the branch-line case—being hard to believe. But once again, this 
raises questions about the status of the intuitions that are so hard to 
dislodge. if the intuitions are just plain wrong, then Parfit deserves at 
the very least some acceptable account as to why they are so hard to 
dislodge, why these intuitions (as opposed to other possible ones) are 
so embedded in our culture, etc. 
Perhaps we can start to see why, once we consider the points made 
salient by The Prestige. We can start to see, that is, why these intuitions 
are not dispensable/overcomeable, except at a most drastic cost. The 
Prestige, by offering us some extraordinary, perhaps conceivable, external 
perspective to our linguistic practices of personhood, helps to make 
clearer the nature of what is internal to those practices. What we per-
haps cannot see, because it is too close to us to be visible, now starts 
to become visible.
i think that, if Parfit responded to my critique as i have suggested 
here that he would, his response would evidence his unwillingness to 
consider the possibility that philosophers may need to broaden their 
canon of what can be counted as arguments or reasons (a possibility 
that, following Wittgenstein and cavell, we can and should appreciate). 
or that philosophers should be willing to consider things that are not 
arguments or reasons; that philosophers should be willing to learn 
from film and literature. or at least this: that if philosophers themselves 
adduce literature—if they tell tales of their own—then they need to be 
ready to consider the possibility that those tales may not tell the tales 
(or have the morals) that they want them to. such is, i think, true of 
Parfit’s branch-line case. it already veers in a direction that Parfit himself 
doesn’t welcome, once one starts to think it through. That direction is 
only accentuated, and developed, by the wonderful tales told at length 
by Priest and by the nolans.
The way that Parfit, unlike many moral philosophers (and unlike 
nearly all non-Utilitarians, in my experience), is openly willing at times 
to be bluntly revisionistic is refreshing. But the concomitant and grave 
risk he thus runs is of losing touch with our emotionality, our relational 
sociality, what we call our humanity. He runs the risk of losing touch, 
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for instance, with the way our individuality is utterly bound up with our 
spatial position, our conversational placement, and what we can hope 
for—for ourselves as well as for others.
finally, Parfit might respond that, even if i am right in my think-
ing, i can hardly hope to have established it, as against him, via film 
and literature; for he might maintain that the tale he tells is a thought 
experiment rather than a short story.18 The point of a thought experi-
ment as practiced by analytic philosophy is to have all the variables 
under control, so that one single point can be established. How could 
that point be refuted by a work of art?
But, as i have already intimated, one point of literature and film is to 
show that, however much one thinks one has the variables under con-
trol, they virtually always creep back in, on deeper reflection, to affect 
in unexpected ways the point to be established. They always remain, as 
one might put it, variable. Parfit’s tale attempts to cut off the experiment 
at the point where we imagine what the “me” on Mars would think. a 
good short story, by contrast, might end at the same point, but it might 
aim instead to make those unmentioned thoughts of the “me” on Mars 
pregnant in what is said about me on earth; to make them unavoidable, 
even as they are not mentioned. 
if a short story contains all the variables that a thought experiment 
tries to control or put out of play, a novel or a feature film gives free 
reign to those variables, and allows them to develop and influence the 
single point from multiple angles.
and this is precisely what we find in the current case. The Prestige 
is a scintillating and disturbing meditation on doubling. The movie 
version of The Prestige has a purer sense of doubleness than the novel 
from which it was adapted. in the movie, Parfitian teletransportation 
occurs over and over again, producing doubles each time (and each 
time, one angier swiftly murders the other), whereas in the book the 
human being is not doubled; the untransported version merely becomes 
an inert body. However, we should note the following: Priest’s novel 
in one respect is closer to exploring Parfit’s branch-line case than the 
nolans’ movie is. for, in the novel, there is one crucial time when the 
teletransportation occurs (see Priest, pp. 302–5) when the man to be 
transported (angier) partially duplicates, such that the version of him 
left untransported becomes ill and has a death sentence of a few months 
hanging over him—just as in Parfit.
The Prestige offers, i believe, a lovely analogue to the attractions of 
metaphysics/philosophy, as Wittgenstein sees (and aims to cure) these. 
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as cutter, the magicians’ assistant, puts it at the start of the film: “you’re 
not really looking [to see how the trick was carried out]; you don’t want 
to know. you want to be fooled” (The Prestige script, pp. 3–4). This is very 
much Wittgenstein’s attitude to our more-or-less willful acquiescence in 
the conjuring tricks of metaphysics.19 Wittgenstein consistently sees an 
analogy between magic and metaphysics, between prestidigitation and 
philosophy (except philosophy undertaken according to “our method”). 
i think he might well have welcomed the subtle uncovering from the 
inside, and (if you will) the deconstructive criticism of the attractive but 
dubious “deconstructive” Parfitian philosophy of personal identity, that 
the nolans pull off in The Prestige.
Wittgenstein can be compared to the debunker of magic tricks; cru-
cially, to a debunker of the audience’s willing complicity in the tricks 
and desire to believe. Wittgensteinians dare to attempt to show that, 
and how such tricks are nothing but the dirty little secret that lies at 
the heart of them, combined with our willingness to see through them 
to this secret: “compare the solution of philosophical problems with 
the fairy tale gift that seems magical in the enchanted castle, and if it 
is looked at in daylight is nothing but an ordinary bit of iron.”20 no 
wonder, then, that Wittgensteinians are widely disliked in philosophy; 
for who, really, deep down, doesn’t want to believe that the emperor is 
wearing clothes? 
VII
To sum up what i have undertaken: in this paper, a work (or two 
works) of film/literature, the nolans’ and Priest’s The Prestige, has been 
used to challenge the method and alleged moral of Parfit’s famous 
branch-line teletransportation thought experiment. By treating Parfit’s 
little tale as a story, a (fragment of a) work of literature, we have seen 
how it need not have the moral that Parfit alleges for it. The nolans’ 
version of The Prestige combats Parfit directly; the nolans answer Parfit.
it is striking, for instance, that the film of The Prestige presents a situ-
ation that is almost exactly parallel to that envisaged in Parfit’s famous 
story. (in Priest’s novel the parallel is, on balance, less striking.) in the 
film, the only departure from Parfit is that it is not clear that one of 
the duplicates is fated to die young. (They never live long enough for 
us to find out, for they are all immediately killed by the other survi-
vor.) in Priest’s novel, the duplication (i.e., teletransportation) process 
produces simply one unchanging corpse and one survivor. The only 
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time duplication produces an extra live human being is when Borden 
interrupts the procedure midflow, and then one of the products is a 
kind of wraith, and the other a normal survivor but with reduced body 
weight who has a built-in death-date from then on. (of course, this last 
feature does strikingly echo Parfit, as explicated above.) 
in other words: one of the changes that the nolans choose to make 
to Priest’s fascinating novel is to bring the story, on balance, into more 
direct “alignment” with—and thus into more direct competition with—
Parfit’s story. clearly, when one reads the novel and sees the film, the 
film especially is intended to engage critically in a direct conversation 
with—and, i have suggested, to undermine the would-be moral of—
something awfully like Parfit’s story. (am i claiming that the nolans 
must actually have read Parfit? either they have read [or otherwise 
encountered secondhand] Parfit’s ideas, or this is a remarkable case 
of “great minds think alike”—except, of course, that the film, in my 
opinion, engages willy-nilly in a critique of Parfit, such that it ends up 
not thinking alike to him, after all…). 
in passing, we might also say that these thoughts of mine have en 
passant helpfully exemplified how film may sometimes be better, on bal-
ance, than literature at posing challenges to established philosophical 
ideas. This possibility gives a new impetus to the thought that there is 
something fake, something just plain mistaken, about the “high art” 
claim, sometimes made even today, that if books are made into films, 
the films are invariably the inferior artworks—in part, because film can 
sometimes better convey lived human realities, because (unlike litera-
ture) it consists largely of people (actors, etc.) doing things.21 But in 
part, it is simply a matter of happenstance: we have to look and see, on 
a case-by-case basis, whether a given film or novel is better at making 
or challenging some particular philosophical case. 
Much (though not all) of the reason why The Prestige is, in my view, an 
even more satisfyingly philosophical film on balance than The Prestige is 
a philosophical novel is not to do with specifically filmic techniques but 
rather with the nature of the (substantial) changes that were made to 
the narrative in the scriptwriting and editing. Priest’s novel at certain 
points perhaps thematizes more beautifully the element of will that is 
required to overcome delusion, as Wittgenstein famously emphasizes 
in philosophy: thus my epigraphs to this paper. 
as indicated above, the real problem in The Prestige, as in Wittgenstein, 
is that we want to be deceived; we willingly acquiesce in the conjur-
ing trick, whether practiced by a metaphysician or a magician (or a 
147 Rupert Read
filmmaker).22 But the nolans’ film (and i have probably only scratched 
the surface of its many thoughtful thematic and philosophic subtleties) 
is ultimately, on balance, the more impressive (broadly Wittgensteinian) 
“therapeutic” work, in terms of its content and the actual work that it 
does. for its delicate and detailed exploration of the philosophy of 
personal identity is potentially transformative—and a hammer blow 
against the hugely influential tale that Parfit tells.
Moreover, one might now remark more explicitly on the parallels 
between prestidigitation and filmmaking, and dwell further on the 
intrinsic manipulative effects of cinema for which christopher nolan 
seems to have particular acuity and liking. (in this connection, The 
Prestige fits both smoothly and strikingly into the sequence of philo-
sophical masterpieces that includes Memento and Inception.) for instance, 
nolan is clearly interested in the willingness of the filmic audience to 
be taken in by the performance of christian Bale, who plays the part of 
both Borden twins to great effect; anecdotally, i have heard of hardly 
anyone who guessed Borden’s secret before it was revealed to angier 
and audience alike in a marvelous “prestige” moment just before the 
film’s end. (see my earlier discussion of our failure to spot Borden’s 
secret sacrifice of one life shared between two. of course, the irony 
is that the two Bordens are, mostly, played by one and the same actor, 
sometimes intercut using contemporary film-editing methods; and the 
same for the various angiers.) 
in this way nolan may be likened to a magician. 
one fails to see through the trick around which Borden has built his 
life, even though there are innumerable clues; this failure is mirrored 
in the film itself by the inability of angier to see through Borden’s trick 
or guess his secret, and by the way in which Borden cannot see through 
angier’s dual identity (as Lord caldwell as well as Robert angier). And 
yet we still don’t see. Moreover, they both “survive” death because they 
are both (in the end) doubled (angier via the Tesla machine)—and 
yet neither suspects the other of doing so.
in other words: even though they share essentially the same secret, 
Borden and angier do not guess each other’s. They don’t want to 
believe/see that they are not as unique (in their doubledness) as they 
think they are. Thus, they are all too willing to believe the other’s secret 
diaries—revelations of the soul, but intended (in this case, in each case) 
to deceive. 
Moreover, neither even wants to know the other’s remaining, magical 
secret at the one moment when he actually gets the chance to know it; 
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when he is directly offered it. angier turns down the chance to know 
the secret of “the transported man” when Borden offers it to him while 
in jail; while, at the film’s very end, Borden turns down the chance 
to know the secret of “the new transported man.” He doesn’t want to 
see  the “prestige” materials. nor, as cutter says to us in the film’s final 
lines, in voiceover, do we. We didn’t want to think about what angier’s 
“rehearsal space” is for (too unpleasant: the dead products of those 
teletransportations, assembled together; what Parfit, too, doesn’t want 
us to see or dwell on). 
“you want to be fooled,” cutter repeats to us. cutter himself, of 
course, doesn’t want to see, either, and doesn’t guess angier’s secret 
or doubledness. (While the deliberately chosen blind stagehands are a 
reminder of this “blindness” that we all willfully share.) He is speaking 
to us at the end—as Borden was at the start. Borden’s whisper at the 
very opening of the film, “are you watching closely?” (The Prestige script, 
p. 1) signals clearly to us that this is a film about watching films closely, 
and being able to really see them—in spite of our urge not to (see PI, 
p. 109). it signals this to us—provided we are not already too caught 
up in the desire to be fooled.
of course, we as audience are now empowered to overcome this 
desire on our part not to see. and thus, the crucial difference between 
magicians and (philosophical) filmmakers—a difference that brings film-
makers like nolan into close alignment with therapeutic philosophers 
like Wittgenstein—is that by the end of the film, one has been put in a 
position to see how everything of consequence has been revealed, made 
available to one’s understanding. one isn’t left stuck in a position of 
willed nonseeing; rather, one is enabled to see the world aright through 
the film (by coming to “see through” the film, as the film ultimately 
intends). The Prestige helpfully draws attention to our desire not to see. 
nolan is interested in how the philosophical filmmaker can thus grow 
his viewer’s autonomy by drawing the viewer’s attention to her own 
desires to trap herself, and not to see—much as Wittgenstein seeks to 
help midwife a truer autonomy on the part of his reader, an autonomy 
all the more powerful because of its self-aware emergence from the 
myriad temptations of heteronomy.
VIII
in conclusion, we can say this: The film enables us to see what the 
Bordens and angiers don’t really want to see, in not wanting to look 
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at what a horror story they have made of their lives (surely on balance 
more than a triumph); and what their women certainly don’t want to 
see. Though in fact it is they, going on a painful “journey” that turns out 
to involve having to see this, who perhaps (be-)come closest to being 
role-models for the realizers of true philosophical insight (sarah in 
particular; at p. 99 of The Prestige script, sarah says to Borden, “i know 
what you really are, alfred!”). and we don’t want to see, either. But: 
nothing is hidden, if only we can learn how to see what is before our 
eyes. What Borden and angier don’t want to see is this: that the two 
Bordens are in fact crucially, definitively different from one another: 
one loves sarah, the other loves olivia. That the two angiers, each time 
the Tesla machine is fired up, are crucially, definitively different from 
one another: one is in a position to kill the other. and, to top it off: 
that Borden and angier are actually the closest the film gives us to true 
doppelgangers. They are so alike that they can’t bear to see this; each is 
horrified by the other. 
This likeness, which i have developed as a theme during this paper, 
goes beyond their mutual utter devotion to their art, and their concomi-
tant obsession goes beyond even their doubleness and mutual unsus-
pectedness to the point of both losing their wives to death. (Borden 
accidentally kills angier’s wife; Borden’s wife kills herself because she 
can’t bear his Jekyll-and-Hyde relationship to her.) Both sequentially 
lose the same mistress. (olivia leaves angier because of his coldness in 
offering her to Borden as an assistant in order to trick him, and she 
leaves Borden because of his coldness over his wife’s suicide.) 
Their similarity is the great hidden theme of the film. We realize early 
on that Borden and angier are in respects alike, of course, despite their 
many superficial differences and their mutual hatred; what we don’t 
suspect until we are gradually forced to face it is that they are, in the 
end, surprisingly (and we resist seeing this) the best model the movie 
has to offer for what it would be truly to have a doppelganger. To say it 
again: they are arguably more akin to each other, in the end, in their 
denial and their destruction of their own lives and each other’s, than 
the Bordens are to one another or than the repeated angier pairs are 
to one another. This is a secret that we can learn. it flagrantly cuts 
against the assumptions that Parfit marshals, underlying his claim that 
the branch-line case shows us that something as good as survival—that 
both angier and Borden in their different ways have in the film, even 
as their doubles die—is quite good enough. We might even say, instead, 
that the spirit of angier lives in the surviving Borden twin. However, this 
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is a miserable form of survival; a form dependent on a failure (on both 
their parts) to live decently, a failure to understand the deepest aspects 
of oneself and one’s relation to others, a failure to see.
Parfit thought that Wittgenstein wouldn’t have had time for science 
fiction stories as guides to philosophy. on the contrary, it is arguably 
Wittgensteinian philosophers, such as myself, stephen Mulhall, and 
stanley cavell, who have done more than any others to show the rel-
evance of such stories (including The Prestige and Mulhall’s great analy-
ses of BladeRunner and other works) to philosophy. But this relevance 
operates very differently from the way that Parfit foregrounds. indeed, 
i hope to have shown here that—when we approach Parfit’s own writ-
ing in a spirit that tries to take seriously and imaginatively inhabit the 
human living that his famous branch-line case snapshots—we end up 
with conclusions very different than his, conclusions that fundamentally 
undermine those that he wants us to read off his little piece of litera-
ture. Moreover, i have suggested that the film version of The Prestige, in 
particular, effects this challenge and reaches these conclusions itself. i 
am only drawing attention to the meaning (and effect) of it. 
Thus the final moral of the story I have told is this: if philosophers 
are going to do some storytelling, they had better do it with enough 
length and depth. When one does so, in the present case—as Priest 
and (in particular) the nolans do—the story told no longer supports 
Parfittian conclusions.23
University of east anglia
1. derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (oxford: oxford University Press 1986), hereafter 
abbreviated RP. Parfit imagines me saying, “i can see and hear myself … starting to 
speak.” But evidently i don’t “see” myself in the same way i see myself when i look in a 
mirror (a difference not captured merely by the fact that on the screen i am not left-
right reversed). and if i talk to myself here it can’t be at all similar to the muttering i 
do when i’m standing in the kitchen trying to remember what i went in there for. for 
when i genuinely talk to myself, then (roughly) i’m never surprised by what i hear. But 
i could be surprised by what my “Martian self” says in Parfit’s story. see further below; 
also note 3 for a doubt about whether Parfit himself buys into the presentation that he 
apparently offers at this point in his little tale. 
2. Here i have problems with the use of “he” or “myself” that Parfit seemingly wants 
us to accept. Better would be to say that something apparently almost exactly like me 
151 Rupert Read
is going to survive on Mars. insisting that this thing is, in practice, as good as being me 
would be making a radical (and, as i shall show, dangerously misleading) revision to our 
language (see note 3). indeed, it would beg the question.
3. The scare quotes here are essential, because otherwise one risks misinterpreting 
Parfit. He is not necessarily committed to believing that my “replica” on Mars would in 
some sense literally be me. To think that he is would be to underestimate the subtlety 
of Parfit’s presentation. That my “replica” on Mars would be me is apparently implied 
by the remarks Parfit allows himself in the first few paragraphs of his piece of science 
fiction. But he then, as i understand him, denies that my replica would be me, or my 
self, or anything of the kind. What he does claim is that my relation to my replica is 
as good as ordinary survival. That is a different claim—and is basically what i contest, 
especially later in this paper. 
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (oxford: Blackwell, 1965), p. 62.
5. The greatest analyses of such turn taking and its psychosocial importances are to 
be found in ethnomethodological conversation analysis. see also part 1 of Rupert Read, 
Applying Wittgenstein (London: continuum, 2007) for a Wittgensteinian perspective on 
the centrality of such dialogue in language (and in identity).
6. although Parfit might not entirely deny this. in creating fission cases like (t)his, 
he draws on shoemaker’s Brownson brain-division thought experiment; see sydney 
shoemaker and Richard swinburne, Personal Identity (oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 
78–79, e.g. shoemaker is fairly clear that we have two different people who will become 
much more different as time progresses and they lead different lives. (This difference 
is surely radically accelerated as they have this initial conversation, as they experience 
the curious external otherness of the other self.) The point nevertheless is that Parfit 
does not foreground this divergence; it is absent from his discussion. He presumably 
then does not see it as central, as i do.
7. christopher Priest, The Prestige (new york: Tom doherty associates, 1995); hereafter 
abbreviated Priest.
8. The script of the movie is widely available online; i reference during this paper the 
following version: www.dailyscript.com/scripts/Prestige.pdf; hereafter abbreviated The 
Prestige script.
9. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. g. e. M. anscombe (1953; 
repr., new york: Macmillan, 1958 ), section 308; hereafter abbreviated PI.
10. Joel Backstrom, “Wittgenstein and the Moral dimension of Philosophical Problems,” 
in o. Kuusela and M. Mcginn, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein (oxford: oxford 
University Press, 2011).
11. as quoted in gordon Baker, “Wittgenstein: concepts or conceptions?” The Harvard 
Review of Philosophy, 9 (2001): 20. 
12. i owe this potential objection to helpful correspondence with stephen Mulhall 
on The Prestige.
13. see earlier quote from Wittgenstein on dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, above. austin 
thought much the same, and more or less rightly so, in my view. compare this, from 
152 Philosophy and Literature
isaiah Berlin (from “austin and the early Beginnings of oxford Philosophy,” in Essays 
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 i agree with goodenough’s and Loughlin’s published criticisms of Parfit-style 
and Star Trek–style teletransporting and dubious atomistic or quasi-cartesian assumptions 
about human being and about continuity that underlie them and other Parfit thought 
experiments. The present piece, however, is designed to show that, even if we grant the 
kinds of scenarios that Parfit (descartes, early Putnam, etc.) uses, we still don’t get the 
conclusions he (they) want! This can be seen by studying properly the tales that Parfit 
and the others tell.
